Nvidia’s Security Team Faces Hard Questions

Threat assessment: high. Nvidia’s longtime security chief stepped down in August. Two and a half months later, CEO Jensen Huang left the company amid growing questions about his extramarital relationships. According to TechCrunch AI, one of those relationships involved an executive at Megaspeed, a Singapore data center company that U.S. investigators suspect of funneling Nvidia chips to China.

The question TechCrunch AI is asking is a fair one: where was the security team while all this was happening?

🎯 Situation Report

Here’s what we know:

  1. The security exit. David Reber spent seven years at Nvidia, the last four as chief security officer. He left in late August and cited health reasons. He wrote on LinkedIn that he’d been diagnosed with young-onset Parkinson’s more than two years earlier: “This wasn’t a pivot I had planned. But I know what needs to come first: family and health.”
  2. The replacement. Saša Zdjelar took over. He spent 17 years at ExxonMobil, then a year at Salesforce and several years at cybersecurity firm ReversingLabs.
  3. The CEO exit. Huang left after reports about his relationship with the Megaspeed executive. Those reports then widened to two separate affairs with Nvidia employees. The New York Times cited five employees describing a relationship with a vice president who reported directly to him. Reuters later reported a second one.
  4. The legal angle. Nvidia’s top lawyer was engaged with the government’s Megaspeed inquiry more than a year ago, according to the Times. Megaspeed denies any wrongdoing.

Nothing public links Reber’s departure to the Megaspeed matter. Reber, Zdjelar and Nvidia didn’t answer TechCrunch’s questions.

🔍 Why Security Should Have Cared

A CEO’s office relationships usually fall to HR, legal and the board. Security specialists see it differently. Any affair the executive wants kept quiet can hand a foreign intelligence service leverage over that person.

And the Megaspeed relationship wasn’t an office matter at all. It tied Nvidia’s CEO to a company under federal investigation over chip flows to China. That’s a counterintelligence problem, not an HR one.

What stands out here is that people inside Nvidia clearly knew pieces of the picture. Legal knew about the Megaspeed inquiry. Colleagues reportedly knew about the internal relationships. What’s still unclear is whether any of it reached security.

⚠️ The Structural Weakness

Retired senior intelligence officer Nicholas Eftimiades, who says he’s trained more than 1,000 corporate security professionals, laid out why these risks get missed:

  1. Underfunding. Security teams don’t drive revenue, so they often run lean. Eftimiades said CEOs often answer a security team’s warnings with “not a nickel more than compliance.”
  2. Narrow scope. Too many companies treat security as facilities, cyberattacks and physical threats. Insider threats and executive cultivation by foreign services get ignored.
  3. Low-tech collection. Spy services gather much of their intel through everyday conversation, not hacking. That’s very hard to detect.
  4. Long game. Unlike Soviet-era operations, today’s cultivated relationships often last years, not weeks.

Eftimiades also pointed out that rival services often want policy insight more than technology. Who’s pushing to change export rules? Who’s the biggest blocker? “Intel world tends to be like cancer,” he said. “Once it gets into the body, it looks to spread and looks to reach out.”

Hardware can help with that work too. IMSI catchers are devices that pose as cell towers so nearby phones connect to them. A basic one costs about $1,000 and fits in a suitcase. Nobody knows whether one was used against Huang, and his phone was presumably hardened.

📡 Why This Matters for AI

Nvidia isn’t an ordinary chipmaker. Its GPUs are the most export-controlled commercial technology on the planet and sit at the center of U.S.-China tech competition. That makes its leadership a top-tier intelligence target.

For the rest of the AI industry, three things follow:

  1. Executives are attack surfaces. Frontier labs and chip suppliers should expect foreign services to approach their leaders. Eftimiades says anyone doing business with China “will tell you that they’ve been approached.”
  2. Security needs a bigger remit. Insider threats, conflicts of interest and suspicious business ties belong in the security team’s job description.
  3. Boards will push harder. Expect more governance scrutiny of executive conduct at AI companies that sit in export-control hot zones.

🧭 Next Moves

We’ll get a clearer view of what Nvidia’s security team knew, and whether it could have acted, as the board’s independent review plays out. Either way, every AI company handling sensitive tech should be asking the same question about its own security team right now. Full details are in the original TechCrunch AI report.

Scroll to Top